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ABSTRACT
Based on unique field work in southern Somalia, this article explores how the 
interrelationship between jihadi insurgent rulers and traditional authority struc-
tures fostered local order in the southernmost part of Somalia in the period 
2008 to 2012. While the Jihadi insurgent group al-Shabaab’s state project was 
profoundly inspired by jihadi-Salafi ideology when it conquered large parts of 
South-Central Somalia in 2008–2009, it developed a strategy to cooperate with 
and co-opt local authority structures. This was partly a pragmatic approach in 
order to gain control of local institutions and populations. However, utilizing 
the local clan elders was a practical and cost-effective arrangement through 
which al-Shabaab could collect material resources, such as money, weapons, 
new recruits and other local resources. By sustaining the traditional authority 
structures, al-Shabaab also fostered a degree of trust and legitimacy from the 
local populations.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 16 January 2020; Accepted 2 June 2020 
KEYWORDS Non-state armed groups; rebel governance; Jihadism; insurgency; traditional authorities; 
civil war; legitimacy
Introduction
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia, usually only referred to as al- 
Shabaab (‘the youth’), is one of only a few jihadi insurgent groups globally 
that has ruled substantial territories and populations over time and continues 
to do so. The group emerged from a close network of strongly committed 
Somali jihadi-Salafis,1 several of whom had fought and trained with al-Qaida 
in Afghanistan.2 Throughout 2008 and 2009 it transformed into a dominant 
politico-military force in Somalia and managed to establish de facto state 
authority in most of the southern and central areas of the country.3 In 
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contrast to many of the clan-based militia groups of the 1990 s and early 
2000 s,4 al-Shabaab has provided relative social and political order to large 
parts of South-Central Somalia for more than a decade.5
Along with Western military interventions and the rise of self-declared 
Islamic states or emirates in areas such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, the 
Sahel and Somalia, academic interest in encounters between jihadi insur-
gents and local communities dominated by kinship loyalties and patriarchal 
orders has increased.6 Existing literature shows that the quality and trajectory 
of these relationships varies greatly across the different theatres.7 Studies of 
the so-called ‘Sunni Awakening’ in Iraq in 2006–2007 describes how certain 
Sunni tribes, who had by and large cooperated with the local al-Qaeda group, 
later turned and were vital in pushing the jihadi insurgents out of the area.8 
Yet, in several ‘tribal’ areas jihadi insurgent groups have successfully 
entrenched themselves for years, and, in a number of cases have managed 
to establish surprisingly long-lasting social and political orders within their 
territories of dominance.9 A puzzle, then, is how the Jihadi insurgent groups, 
often described as revolutionary and anti-systemic socio-political forces,10 
have been able to navigate pre-existing and often divisive forces of kinship 
group structures? Based on the Somali case, this paper proposes that success-
ful handling of local kinship structures rests on the Jihadi insurgents’ ability to 
balance strong institutional control with a pragmatic approach to pre-exist-
ing local institutions. By coopting instead of dismantling local authority 
structures, the jihadi insurgents facilitate social and political control, obtain 
material benefits and generate some level of legitimacy.
The number of studies of non-state armed groups’ governance of civilian 
populations, usually referred to as ‘rebel governance’,11 is rising.12 Yet, in- 
depth explorations of local mechanisms linked to the role of traditional 
authorities in the construction and maintenance of ‘wartime institutions’13 
in areas ruled by jihadi insurgent groups over time are scarce.14 This paper 
supports the view that Jihadi state projects are dominated by young men, not 
traditional authorities, and that in several respects they can be described as 
intensely ideological projects.15 However, the analysis also exposes another 
vital dimension of these entities: a large dose of pragmatism in the exercise of 
local governance. Although local traditional authorities are not presented as 
formal leaders, their roles and functions are profoundly systemized and 
becomes a vital part of the Jihadi “state’s” local institutions. To understand 
and highlight jihadi insurgents’ pragmatic approach to governance is vital for 
several reasons. Firstly, it provides valuable insight into a little-known dimen-
sion of Jihadi insurgent groups ruling territories. Secondly, it challenges the 
tendency to consider Jihadi groups’ as something substantially different from 
other revolutionary insurgent groups. While the propagated ideological 
views of Jihadi groups may be important in many respects, this should not 
mislead scholars into overlooking their insurgent nature, facing challenges 
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and opportunities similar to other non-state armed actors striving to fight the 
existing state or world order.16
The discussion in this paper rests on unique oral accounts gathered 
through interviews with individuals who either participated in, were eye-
witnesses to or who have extensive knowledge of the events in Lower 
Jubba province described here. While most interviewees were participants 
in the events unfolding, some non-participant observers with insight into the 
local dynamic in the province were also selected.17 To cross-check the stories 
of the interviewees, the author has, as far as possible, attempted to 
triangulate18 the information obtained by interviewing persons in different 
positions and from different clans and sub-clans. Where available, written 
accounts, have been used to assess the reliability of the information. The 
historical narrative rests primarily on 73 semi-structured in-depth interviews, 
conducted by the author between 2017 and 2019, with a wide range of 
interviewees. They include former faction leaders, militia fighters, Islamist 
leaders, Islamist foot soldiers, politicians, a civil society group, a women’s 
group, clan elders and Somali academics. Several of the interviews in Kismayo 
were group interviews, varying in size between two to 15 people. The 
majority of interviews were conducted in Kismayo, some in Mogadishu and 
Nairobi. A few interviews were also conducted in Oslo. The discussion also 
draws upon semi-structured in-depth interviews of 18 subjects who were 
either convicts from al-Shabaab’s courts in southern Somalia or had in other 
ways been closely involved with criminal cases tried in those courts. These 
interviews were conducted by the author in Nairobi in October 2010, when al- 
Shabaab exercised considerable authority throughout Lower Jubba.
Kismayo was liberated from the militant Islamist group al-Shabaab in 
September 2012 and the frontline between the Islamist forces and local 
security forces lies about 50 km from the city. Except for a few IED19 attacks 
and one major complex attack20 in Kismayo, the local administration, with 
military support from African Union soldiers, has been able to provide a 
decent level of security for the population within the zone, making on-the- 
ground research by non-Somalis possible. During fieldwork, substantial risk- 
mitigating measures were taken, in close dialogue with local research 
assistants, in order not to put any interview subjects, the research assistants 
nor the author, at risk. In light of the still fragile situation in Kismayo and 
southern Somalia in general, the names of the interviewees are either omitted 
or replaced with pseudonyms for their own safety.21
The first part of the article briefly outlines the subject of interaction 
between a non-state armed group and pre-existing local institutions in the 
broader rebel governance literature. The main analysis will explore firstly how 
al-Shabaab established strong local institutional control in Lower Jubba in the 
period 2008 to 2009 and secondly how al-Shabaab interacted with and 
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exercised local governance through local clan authorities in Lower Jubba 
between 2008 and 2012.
Non-state armed groups and pre-existing local institutions
The emerging ‘rebel governance’ literature focuses on various social and 
political orders developing within territories ruled by jihadi insurgents and 
other non-state armed groups (NSAG).22 A key finding from this growing 
body of literature is that territories governed by NSAGs often establish alter-
native political and social orders with a relatively high level of predictability, 
both for the armed group itself and for the civilian population within that 
territory.23 A NSAG who is able to provide a certain level of social order within 
the territory it dominates may reap considerable rewards.24 While use of 
violence and coercion may often be the primary means to establish initial 
control,25 and could even be sufficient for mobilizing a successful 
insurgency,26 it could be costly for the armed group in the longer term to 
fight and suppress local institutions and networks of power. Instead, to find 
ways to extend its own system of governance and, simultaneously, to man-
age preexisting societal forces may give the armed group obvious material 
benefits, such as local taxation, new recruits and trade, and access to social 
networks and intelligence. By providing social order, the group may also 
bolster its legitimacy in the eyes of the population under its rule.27
For the civilians who strive to survive and make a living within an often 
fluid and uncertain civil war context, social order and predictability may be a 
top priority, far more important even than who is ruling and what kind of 
ideology they propagate.28 According to David Kilcullen, it is often the pre-
dictability inherent in the existence of rules, not the content of the rules 
themselves, far less the popularity of a given government, that creates the 
feeling of safety which allows for a normative system to function.29 As Ana 
Arjona points out, where a NSAG controls a locality, the relations between the 
group and the local community is often as one between the ruler and the 
ruled.30 In such a context, absence of resistance from the civilian population is 
not synonymous with active support or sympathy with the NSAG or its 
ideology. While some forms of cooperation would be needed from the 
civilian population, Ajrona argues that massive obedience from the civilians 
is one of the most vital factors in order to sustain the local orders the NSAG is 
striving to construct and sustain.31
The emergence of al-Shabaab’s Jihadi ‘State’
When al-Shabaab defeated a powerful clan-based militia and conquered 
Kismayo32 in August 2008 as part of a larger Jihadi insurgent coalition,33 it 
immediately established a relatively comprehensive administrative 
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structure, unprecedented in the civil war. On top was the wali or governor,34 
the senior officials heading the various offices and a city council or shura, 
consisting of al-Shabaab members from most of the clans in the area.35 
There was an office of justice, an office of da’wa or religious education, 
finance and zakat or taxation, and social affairs. The offices in Kismayo and 
other cities in Lower Jubba were subordinate to and closely integrated into 
the centralized institutions under emir Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohamed ‘Godane’, 
his supreme shura council and the executive powers of the major 
‘ministries’.36
Al-Shabaab’s form of governance in Lower Jubba corresponds well to 
Arjona’s concept of ‘rebelocracy’.37 The concept constitutes a kind of social 
and political order emerging within the context of civil war where non-state 
armed groups intervene broadly in local civilian affairs, i.e. beyond mere 
provision of security and taxation. Where a rebelocracy emerges, the armed 
group in power establishes a wide range of rules and institutions to regulate 
and govern the conduct of the civilian population. Typically, the group 
provides some kind of mechanism to adjudicate disputes, regulate economic 
activities and establish rules which regulate the private sphere, for instance 
how people can dress, sexual behavior etc. Many armed actors also provide 
and regulate basic services like education and health.38
Some of the most notable changes in Kismayo after the Jihadi insurgents 
came to power was the establishment of a new court and police system.39 
According to Arjona, administration of justice is one of the most important 
attributes of rebelocracy. Through control of dispute institutions, the armed 
ruler can penetrate the community, obtain information about its members 
and networks and control the civilian population. By controlling these institu-
tions, the ruler would not only be the authority who enforces existing 
regulations, he would be the one interpreting them and creating precedent, 
consolidating the regulatory system that the ruler aims to establish. By 
arbitrating local justice, the armed ruler may also increase his legitimacy in 
the eyes of the local community.40
Al-Shabaab’s court system, termed ‘sharia courts’ by al-Shabaab, were a 
responsibility of religious judges or qadis, and heard all kinds of cases, from 
disputes about grass rights to serious crimes. The police, or hisbah, would 
handle ordinary petty crimes as well as transgressions against the strict moral 
codes issued by al-Shabaab’s leadership. The hisbah officers wore their own 
type of uniforms, different from ordinary soldiers in the al-Shabaab army, 
Jabha, and could punish minor offenses on the spot, often by whipping the 
perpetrator. The Hisbah cooperated closely with the courts and would bring 
perpetrators of more serious violations to the courts for further trial. In several 
cases, corporal punishments were executed in front of large crowds. In 
advance of such displays, al-Shabaab would announce it through loudspea-
kers and demand that all citizens gather in order to watch the punishment 
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being carried out. Those who refused to attend would face punishments 
themselves.41
Along with al-Shabaab’s strict regulations, heavy-handed enforcement 
and display of harsh punishments, social order was quickly established in 
Kismayo and large parts of Lower Jubba. As long as the population adhered 
to the strict public moral codes and decrees, most would be left to go on with 
their every-day lives. Several Kismayo residents recall how they could walk 
freely around town, not being afraid of armed khat-chewing militiamen.42 
‘You could even leave your shop unlocked without fearing that anyone would 
steal from it’, a former Kismayo resident recalls.43
Clan Elders and Jihadi institutions
When the formal state institutions evaporated in Somalia at the end of the 
1980 s, the clan institutions experienced a kind of renaissance. As most other 
networks failed to give sufficient security and provide for basic needs, even 
urban elites and ardent Islamists fled to the strongholds of their clan groups 
throughout Somalia.44 However, the sudden pressure on local clan institu-
tions in Lower Jubba and the rest of South-Central Somalia represented an 
enormous challenge to the largely localized dispute resolution mechanisms 
inherent in the traditional system. The level of atrocities that skyrocketed 
during the first years of the civil war, like mass killings, rape, looting and 
destruction of property, was unprecedented in Somali history. Hence, the 
elders were incapable of settling and solving, through customary law, xeer, 
and traditional modes of consultation, all these far-reaching offenses, often 
conducted by militias from opposing clans groups.45 Extreme politicization of 
clan affiliation during of the civil war in the early 1990 s, whereby clan 
affiliation became the primary denominator for political loyalty, had a nega-
tive impact on the clan elders’ standing and authority as efficient providers of 
peace and reconciliation. In many instances, elders threw their support 
behind politico-military leaders with kinship ties to their own sub-clan, 
which facilitated the recruitment of militia fighters, and therefore made 
them partly responsible for violence against other sub-clans.46
At the time when the Jihadi insurgents rose to dominance in Lower Jubba 
in 2008, a complex hierarchy of clan elders within each clan group remained 
(and remains) intact. The head figure of these entities in Lower Jubba was 
usually called a suldan or ugaas. In some of the clans, the senior position was 
inherited, while in others he was elected among the lower-ranking elders, in 
Lower Jubba referred to as the nabadoons, within the same clan group. The 
suldan or ugas was the main authority when dealing with other clans or 
political entities, such as al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, whenever a dispute 
arose, it was usually the nabadoons who dealt with the case. Only if naba-
doons on successive levels were unable to solve it would the suldan or ugaas 
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get involved. Typical cases within and between clans include everyday ques-
tions and disputes related to grassing, land and water issues, killings and 
injuries, and how to collect and distribute blood money, diya. Yet, the clan 
elders do not exercise unlimited power within the clans and may be dis-
missed by their clan if they are deemed unsuited to represent the group. The 
elders should be seen more as the representatives of their clans rather than 
their leaders,47 as per Lewis’ reference to the ‘pastoral democracy’.48
When al-Shabaab came to power in 2008, the clan institutions had not 
been strong enough to establish and sustain a lasting political order in Lower 
Jubba and were vulnerable to the expanding Jihadi insurgents. Already from 
day one, it was quite clear that the clan elders did not enjoy much respect and 
trust from the Jihadi insurgent leaders. When the Jihadis established the new 
administration in Kismayo, they did not consult and include the elders in the 
process.49 Although the city’s 42 members shura council largely reflected the 
clan composition of the area, the seats were occupied by members seen as 
sympathetic to al-Shabaab, not the acknowledged elders representing the 
local clans.50 After the tension between al-Shabaab and Mu’askar Ras 
Kamboni in Kismayo increased, the situation for the clan elders deteriorated. 
Al-Shabaab started viewing many of the local elders as supporters of Mu’askar 
Ras Kamboni. This was especially the case for the Ogadeen elders, whose 
clans comprised most of Mu’askar Ras Kamboni’s members. Over the course 
of a few months, several elders were assassinated by al-Shabaab forces with-
out fair trial.51 Among those killed in Kismayo were Ugaas Hashi and Ugaas 
Sheikh Ahmed, both prominent Ogadeen elders. According to a former al- 
Shabaab commander active in Lower Jubba at the time, the two elders were 
killed ‘(. . .) because al-Shabaab saw them as secret supporters of Madobe’, a 
Mu’askar Ras Kamboni commander who had just returned to Kismayo after 
being held in captivity in Ethiopia.52 Al-Shabaab’s willingness to eliminate any 
opposition from local authority figures, was met with a mixed response from 
the elders in Lower Jubba. Some decided to flee from Kismayo and the other 
major towns in Lower Jubba while others decided to stay, hoping to establish 
a constructive dialogue with their new Jihadi rulers.53
The authority of the remaining clan elders was largely challenged by al- 
Shabaab. The new court and police system took over most of the legal 
responsibilities. All kinds of legal issues, from land and grassing disputes to 
killings and injuries, which had been one of the elders’ core responsibilities, 
were taken over by al-Shabaab-appointed qadis. The new administration also 
introduced new forms of punishment, inspired by the al-Shabaab scholars’ 
rogue interpretation of Islamic legal texts. The execution of punishments like 
stoning, lashing and chopping off of hands and legs were not only terrifying, 
they represented a clear break with local customary clan law, xeer, which in 
general recommended payment of diya, even in the case of serious offenses.-
54 Al-Shabaab’s public punishments clearly displayed disregard for local clan 
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institutions and the authority of the elders, and left little doubt as to who 
were the new masters. The execution of punishments in public carried with it 
strong symbolic power. As argued by James C. Scott this kind of activity 
represents a kind of dramatization of power relations used to achieve coercive 
consent by the subservient population under its rule. The display shows there 
is no other realistic choice for the population other than obedience.55
Early on, al-Shabaab invested significant time and resources on building 
up and systemizing the education sector across all levels, from early reading 
of the Quran and schools for children to religious courses for adults. In 
general, al-Shabaab invested considerably in the reading of religious texts, 
interpreted according to their extremist views, leaving much time to legit-
imize the group’s jihad against the Ethiopians and the Transitional Federal 
Government.56 In addition to most children and youth, who had to attend 
classes by al-Shabaab scholars, religious education was used to ‘reeducate’ 
local clan elders. When al-Shabaab seized power in Kismayo, several of the 
most senior clan elders were required to attend special religious courses held 
exclusively for them in order to ‘guide them on the right path’. The courses 
consisted mostly of reading of the accepted religious texts. While this ‘reed-
ucation’ of the elders, turning them into ‘better Muslims’, definitely made 
sense within the context of al-Shabaab’s larger reform project of Somali 
society, it was also a way of highlighting who was the primary authority in 
the area.57
The pragmatism of Jihadi governance – control and material 
benefits
When the opposition from Mu’askar Ras Kamboni and Mu’askar Anole58 was 
defeated by al-Shabaab forces in Kismayo in October 2009,59 there were few 
realistic political alternatives that could challenge al-Shabaab’s authority in 
the area in the period 2009–2011. The previously unpopular Marehan-domi-
nated government of Barre Hirralle, which was driven out in August 2008, did 
not longer pose a real threat. Ethiopian forces had retreated from Somalia in 
January 2009 and the Transitional Federal Government had little reach out-
side the capital of Mogadishu, and was struggling to defend the city center of 
Mogadishu from an increasingly fierce offensive dominated by al-Shabaab.60 
Al-Shabaab had transformed and developed into a de facto state authority in 
most parts of South-Central Somalia.
Al-Shabaab’s ability to establish new local institutions and interfere exten-
sively with the traditional authority of the clan elders rested largely on its 
ability to use – or threaten to use – violence. ‘Adow’, a former al-Shabaab 
Jabha61 commander, describes how ‘peace came with force’ in Kismayo. 
Crime and open resistance were almost eradicated in the city because the 
local population was afraid of the strict punishments executed by al- 
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Shabaab.62 There was little reason to doubt al-Shabaab’s will and ability to 
crush any sign of opposition from its subservient citizens, including the 
elders.63
Regardless of the insurgent leadership’s conscious strategy towards local 
structures and powers, however, ultimately any new social and political 
order is built on the existing social and cultural fabric. New institutions 
and practices will thus emerge as a result of continuous negotiations with 
local systems of order, both during and in the aftermath of conflict.64 
According to a former al-Shabaab executive member, al-Shabaab’s leader-
ship was initially planning to sideline traditional clan elders and forge an 
egalitarian organization that would transform the Somali society.65 Most of 
the original al-Shabaab leaders were strongly inspired by jihadi-Salafi 
ideology66 and had limited regard for the local clan elders.67 However, 
their revolutionary ideas quickly transformed into a more pragmatic 
approach when faced with the large populations under their rule. 
According to a former al-Shabaab Da’wa commander in Lower Jubba,68 al- 
Shabaab’s leaders decided to keep the system of elders ‘(. . .) because clan 
elders are important for the community. Without them, it would be difficult 
to rule the population’.69 A central factor explaining the changing attitudes 
towards the clan elders was undoubtedly population control and the 
avoidance of opposition. In 2009, al-Shabaab faced open resistance from 
several clans in the Hiiran and Galgaduud provinces in Central Somalia.70 
The same year in Lower Jubba, the rebellious Mu’askar Ras Kamboni insur-
gents had mobilized substantial support from several local clans, including 
the dominant Muhamed Zubeyr and Awrmale71 clans.72 Realizing the 
potential dangers of sidelining the major clan authorities, al-Shabaab 
decided to actively engage with them and turn the existing hierarchy into 
a loyal system that it could control. As the former al-Shabaab commander 
‘Adow’ points out, al-Shabaab ‘(. . .) wanted to keep the system in place in 
order to deal with the local population. (. . .) It was a means of securing 
population control’.73 Al-Shabaab’s approach aligns with Zachariah 
Mampilly’s observation that, in order to mitigate challenges from the civilian 
population, ‘(. . .) rebel leaders must often tap into and even co-opt preex-
isting institutions and networks of power’.74 Thus, instead of dismantling 
the traditional institutions, al-Shabaab reached out to the elders in Lower 
Jubba, and demanded that they cooperate with the new administration.75
While they did not generally receive formal positions within al-Shabaab’s 
administrations in Lower Jubba, the clan elders were clearly recognized by al- 
Shabaab’s administration as local authorities and representatives of their clan 
groups. In most of the cases where the senior elders had fled the area, al- 
Shabaab typically replaced them with new elders, so called ‘bush elders’. 
These elders were appointed by al-Shabaab with the intention of upholding 
the existing authority structure.76
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Acknowledgement and cooperation with local clan elders gave al- 
Shabaab’s local administrations in Lower Jubba additional benefits in terms 
of social and political control, ranging from trivial tasks, such as the passing 
on of information from the city administration down to the sub clans of rural 
pastoralists who spend most of their time outside the villages, to large-scale 
provision of material goods and money.77 This is reminiscent of Mancur 
Olson’s famous claims regarding the long-term thinking ‘stationary bandit’ 
who increases his taxes by settling down and treating the local population 
fairly well, in contrast to the ‘roving bandit’ who plunders the population for 
short-term gains.78 In Lower Jubba, there were basically two major categories 
of taxation demanded by the local administration. One was the annual tax, by 
al-Shabaab referred to as zakat, inspired by the religious obligation to pay a 
certain percentage of your money to the greater good. Zakat was primarily 
organized by the local al-Shabaab administrations throughout the province 
and was usually collected during the month of Ramadan. The local adminis-
trations announced when, where and how much to pay for each family. When 
collecting zakat from the pastoralists outside of the towns and villages, the 
tax collectors would typically stay at the wells, waiting for the pastoralists to 
approach with their animals. Although the elders were not responsible for 
following up zakat payments by the people in their sub-clans, they often 
went along with the collectors to make sure the hand-over of animals 
occurred without disputes so that they and could intervene to avoid a violent 
outcome.79 The other kind of taxation was ‘emergency taxes’, the so-called 
infaaq, typically demanded by al-Shabaab when they had particular needs, 
for example before upcoming offensives.80 When such taxes were required, 
either in the form of money, goods or weapons, the clan elders acted as 
important middle-men between the governor in a given town and the local 
population. Al-Shabaab’s local administrators had detailed knowledge of the 
number of people from the various sub-clans in their area and kept close 
track of how much they produced, whether livestock or agricultural products. 
Based on the number of people and the level of production within the various 
clan groups, the governor would specify a certain amount of money or its 
equivalence in products. In addition, he usually demanded a specific number 
of AK rifles, often used by the pastoralists for self-defense. The senior clan 
elders, i.e. the suldan or ugaas, were given a time limit for executing the order 
and collecting the prescribed taxes. As a first response, the suldan or ugaas 
would gather the other elders, the nabadoons, of their sub-clans and agree on 
a just and reasonable way to share the burden within their clan group.81
In addition to taxation and weapons, al-Shabaab’s use of the clan elders 
proved advantageous to recruitment. As Joshua Barter points out, aspiring 
rebel governments may gain a number of benefits from working closely with 
societal forces. While such arrangements may give access to local resources, 
they may also turn out to be cost-effective ventures, ‘(. . .) enabling the rebels 
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to govern while not diverting resources from the war-making’.82 In Lower 
Jubba, as in other parts of al-Shabaab-controlled territories, recruitment 
mechanisms whereby locals were incorporated into the military apparatus 
or other parts of the organization were employed in a number of ways, for 
example through indoctrination and peer pressure in schools and mosques; 
often clan elders were not directly involved.83 However, on some occasions, 
the clan elders in Lower Jubba were ordered to provide a certain number of 
recruits for enrollment into al-Shabaab’s ranks. In a similar way as with the 
infaaq taxation.84 ‘Abdullahi’, a senior clan elder in Kismayo, recalls how his 
brother, who was the clan’s sultan at that time, had to bring 200 recruits from 
his sub clans to al-Shabaab.85 In such cases, the elders strove to share this 
heavy burden as equally as possible between the different sub-clans under 
their responsibility.86
Jihadi Insurgents, Clan Elders and the question of legitimacy
The elders interviewed for this article unanimously described their position as 
very difficult, perceiving themselves as ‘marked men’. If the al-Shabaab rulers 
perceived them to be opponents and a threat to their authority, they were 
convinced al-Shabaab would not hesitate to kill them; this had happened to 
several elders after al-Shabaab conquered the area.87 Ugaas ‘Hussein’, the top 
elder within one of the larger clans in Kismayo, describes his position under 
al-Shabaab’s rule as being ‘like a chicken in a cage’.88 The elders’ cooperation 
with the al-Shabab rulers should consequently not be read as voluntary 
support or even sympathy with al-Shabaab or its ideology. Rather, as Arjona 
points out, the relationship between a non-state armed group and the local 
populations is often one of a ruler and the ruled. Lack of resistance or flight 
may reflect massive obedience by the civilians to the non-state armed group’s 
rule, not active support.89 When an armed group has a high level of control 
within a territory, Arjona argues, cooperation is the dominant civilian strat-
egy, as this pleases the armed rulers. Hence, in such instance resistance to an 
armed group, not cooperation with it, is the quintessential collective action 
problem.90 Stathis Kalyvas highlights that in zones of rebel control, civilians 
tend to collaborate with the group in order to maximize their own security.91
The clan elders who decided to stay under al-Shabaab rule did not do so 
because of deeply felt sympathies or to gain material benefits. They largely 
stayed because they were expected to work for the clan and to defend the 
clan’s interests. The elders knew that if they fled, al-Shabaab would replace 
them with someone else without heeding the clans’ traditional election 
mechanisms. A ‘bush elder’ would exert less authority over and enjoy less 
respect from the clan, and as a result their clansmen would probably be even 
more vulnerable to al-Shabaab encroachment.92 ‘Ahmed’, a former Mu’askar 
Ras Kamboni fighter, recalls the situation in Afmadow, one of the larger cities 
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in Lower Jubba, after al-Shabaab had crushed the rebellion by Mu’askar Ras 
Kamboni. Three nabadoons were killed and several of the senior Ogadeen 
elders escaped to Kenya. With most of the senior elders absent, al-Shabaab’s 
leaders in Afmadow appointed one of their own soldiers as nabadoon, repla-
cing the ones that had left. Although the local clansmen did not approve of 
the decision, they could do nothing about it, due to fear of retribution.93 
Several elders from Lower Jubba who escaped to Kenya recall how people 
from their clans involved in disputes reached out to them on the phone 
asking them to mediate on their behalf, ignoring the ‘bush elders’ operating 
in their area. A number of cases were settled in Kenya after discussions 
between elders who were located far from the actual events within al- 
Shabaab territory.94
Although the clan elders and many other residents in Lower Jubba were 
clearly critical of al-Shabaab’s use of coercion, strict rules and harsh punish-
ments, the level of order and predictability that came with al-Shabaab control 
was profoundly appreciated.95 Besides improved security, a Kismayo resident, 
‘Gardheere’, whose son was an al-Shabaab fighter in Kismayo at the time, 
hails the improved public moral that had emerged in Kismayo, as well as the 
al-Shabaab qadis, whom he assessed to be much better compared to the kind 
of justice often enforced through the power of the gun by various militias 
preceding al-Shabaab.96 Apparently, al-Shabaab’s authority did not only rest 
on coercion and violence alone.
To what extent al-Shabaab enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of the popula-
tion in Kismayo and the wider province is obviously difficult to measure. 
Legitimization processes are complex and a rebel ruler may increase its 
legitimacy in relation to the civilian population within its territory in a number 
of ways.97 However, in addition to providing security, law and order, rebel 
rulers may also secure legitimacy through cooperation with or co-optation of 
preexisting societal forces, signaling an acknowledgment and appeal to 
established cultural codes, norms and practices.98 Following this argument, 
al-Shabaab’s cooperation with or co-optation of the traditional authority 
structures would likely foster some level of legitimacy from the local popula-
tions, although the clan elders themselves did not perceive al-Shabaab as 
legitimate rulers. By cooperating with al-Shabaab’s administration, the elders 
indirectly increased its legitimacy in the eyes of the population the elders 
strove to protect. ‘Adow’ emphasizes the importance of the clan system to 
the inhabitants of Lower Jubba, even under the time of al-Shabaab rule: ‘(. . .) 
the clan system had been there for a long time and people respected the clan 
elders (. . .). The clan system could give them [al-Shabaab] some kind of trust 
among the population.’99 According to several former al-Shabaab members, 
al-Shabaab’s leaders understood the importance of the elders in the eyes of 
the local population in Lower Jubba and therefore allowed them to keep 
some of their former roles.100 For example, al-Shabaab soon transferred some 
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legal powers back to the elders. Although the qadis were without doubt the 
formal authority in all criminal cases and open disputes, elders from the clans 
of the involved parties were often allowed to participate in court. In some 
cases, elders were summoned to serve as witnesses to the trial, sitting beside 
the victim throughout the procedure. More important was perhaps the 
involvement of elders in discussions about the level of diya to be paid by 
the perpetrator. In some instances, the qadi would determine who he found 
to be guilty of the charge, while he left it to the elders of each sub clan of the 
parties involved to negotiate the level of diya and make sure the perpetrators’ 
sub-clan complied. When the elders reached an agreement, they would tell 
the qadi who heard the case to register the decision. There are even examples 
from Kismayo where the qadi allowed the family and elders on each side in 
killing cases to meet and settle the dispute according to xeer rather than 
through court procedures. As long as both sides agreed on the case, the qadi 
would not intervene.101 It is, however, difficult to conclude to what extent 
such practice was formalized, or whether it took place on a more ad hoc basis. 
There are nevertheless indications that involvement of elders in court cases 
increased with time.102 However, in more serious cases, such as those invol-
ving capital punishment, the elders didn’t play any role at all.103
Conclusion
Al-Shabaab’s emerging Jihadi ‘state’ institutions were largely a construct and 
synthesis of reformist ideas and a continuation of preexisting clan institu-
tions. In a sense, this is not surprising, as all armed groups, regardless of their 
conscious strategy towards local structures and powers, negotiate with (pre) 
existing forms of order in one way or another. However, al-Shabaab’s state 
project shows how a Jihadi insurgent group, deeply inspired by Jihadi-Salafi 
ideology, developed a strategy to cooperate with and co-opt local authority 
structures. This was partly a pragmatic way to gain control of local institutions 
and the populations. However, utilizing the elders was also a practical and 
cost-effective arrangement through which al-Shabaab could collect material 
resources, such as money, weapons, new recruits and other local resources. 
Although it is difficult to measure the al-Shabaab rulers level of legitimacy in 
the eyes of the local population in Lower Jubba, sustaining the traditional 
authority structures probably earned the local jihadi insurgent administration 
a degree of trust and legitimacy. The elders’ position was obviously challen-
ging, and they often found themselves caught ‘between a rock and a hard 
place’. However, they could, to some extent at least, continue to serve their 
people and uphold some level of authority within their communities. Behind 
all the fear, atrocities and violence experienced by most communities under 
the rule of al-Shabaab, the synthesis of two seemingly opposed political 
systems constructed a remarkably stable and functional political and social 
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order within the context of the Somali civil war and continues to do so in 
several provinces in South-Central Somalia even today.
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